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Dynamic context aware systems need highly flexible privacy 
protection mechanisms. We describe an extension to an 
existing RBAC-based mechanism that utilises a dynamic 
measure of invasiveness to determine whether contextual 
information should be released.  
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INTRODUCTION:  
There are serious privacy issues that must be addressed 
before publicly acceptable context-aware systems can be 
deployed on a large scale [1, 2, 3]. Experimental systems 
have been developed for use in areas such as homes [4] 
or offices [5] where, arguably, restricted numbers of 
participants and closed environments limit privacy 
concerns. In more public areas, including shops, 
transport, gyms [6] or tourist attractions [7], systems will 
require privacy mechanisms with explicit policies to 
manage dynamic personal information as participants 
interact with, and move between, environments. 
Previous work, including our privacy enhancing 
infrastructure [8], and others, e.g. [2], are based on 
classical privacy protection mechanisms such as Role 
Based Access Control (RBAC) [9]. Such mechanisms 
can protect a participant’s privacy but, used alone, are 
insufficiently flexible to address the needs of dynamic, 
context-aware, systems. Here, we outline an extension to 
our privacy protection mechanism that permits a closer 
reflection of our everyday privacy decisions. 
BACKGROUND 
Privacy refers to a person’s right to control the flow of 
information about them. Ownership of information is 
with the subject and its release should be at their 
discretion. Once released in an intelligible form, the 
subject ceases to have any control over their personal 
information. The trust placed in the recipient is therefore 
an important factor in determining whether or not to 
disclose information. Legislation that requires recipients 
to honour any agreement upon which information was 
released is perhaps the only possible protection 
mechanism beyond the point of release. In an imperfect 
world, it must be assumed that this can at best be only a 
discouragement to improper use. 
The ideal level of privacy offered by a system equates to 
that which the participant enjoys offline. Compromising 
privacy should not be a default requirement in order to 
enjoy the benefits of context-aware environments. 
Where personal information is revealed, a privacy 
protection mechanism must permit sufficient 
customisation and flexibility to handle the multitude of 
situations occurring in the real world. 
In earlier work [10] we examined a simple classification 
and clearance scheme (CCS) for privacy protection. 
Each context element was assigned a classification level 
indicating its sensitivity.  Sites, services and other 
participants were assigned clearance values representing 
a level of trust and determining which elements they 
could access. Whilst easy to understand, the approach 
does not scale to deal with large numbers of context 
elements or consumers. More recently, as part of a 
general privacy-enhancing infrastructure [8], we have 
sought to address this problem using Role Based Access 
Control (RBAC).  A list of access controls, each 
referring to a specific element, allows a combination of 
read, write and history access to be granted.  
Both approaches support requests by previously 
unknown consumers, provided that they can express 
their intended use with extended Platform for Privacy 
Preferences Project (P3P) polices [11]. Rulesets 
specifying how information must and must not be used, 
enable automatic decisions to be made on what 
clearance or roles are assigned to a consumer. 
LIMITATIONS 
Although the current privacy protection mechanism 
performs well it does have limitations. In static and 
clearly defined environments it is possible to setup 
RBAC to accurately represent privacy preferences 
because the context in which the preferences are set is 
known. In a dynamic environment privacy preferences 
may change with context. For example, activity 
information may be public when at work but not when at 
home.  
Privacy preferences may also vary according to the 
context of the potential recipient. Conference attendees 
may be prepared to expose more information than usual 
but only to other attendees. Secondly, whilst occasional 
requests for particular context elements, e.g. location or 
velocity, may be permitted, repeated requests may 
represent an unacceptable level of surveillance.  
Similarly, the risk in exposing an element may depend 
on which other elements have been exposed previously, 
either publicly, or to the same recipient. Finally, the 
potential impact of exposure may vary with the precision 
and reliability of the information. It may well be 
acceptable to reveal a rough location, say at town or 
region level, but not exact coordinates or street address. 
PRIVACY INVASIVE VALUE 
To address these limitations we introduce the concept of 
a Privacy Invasive Value (PIV). The idea behind PIV is 
that whilst any release of context information invades 
privacy, the extent of the invasion depends on many 
factors including what information is being released, to 
whom, when, under what circumstances, how often, etc. 
We retain “about what” and “to whom” as the primary 
factors for determining access, so the PIV concept can 
be used to extend the RBAC mechanism. Instead of 
simply assigning read and history access, the mechanism 
will also take account of the PIV. Similarly, in addition 
to roles and personal permissions, participants are 
assigned a maximum level of invasiveness. 
By considering how invasive context consumers are 
allowed to be, a number of things can be achieved. 
Firstly the privacy invasion (PI) of a request for any 
single element may be capped. Secondly the aggregate 
PI of any individual consumer, and its rate of increase, 
can be limited. Thirdly, the aggregate PI may be made to 
decay over time in line with the temporal validity of 
component elements. 
A key benefit is that PIVs and PIs need not be constants. 
The PIV of any context element and the PI of any 
participant can be modified at runtime according to pre-
defined rules. In its simplest form the aggregate PIV is 
the sum of those of the released elements. In a more 
complex situation, the effective PIV of a requested 
element may be modified according to the current 
context of the owner and, if possible, that of the 
requestor. Similarly the PIV may be modified depending 
on previous actions, e.g. the release of a combination of 
location and velocity may be far more invasive then 
either alone. Finally reducing the precision of an element 
may incur a lower PIV, and so enable its release. 
IMPLICATIONS 
The introduction of PIV offers a gain in flexibility. Not 
only can many more privacy preferences be expressed, 
the extension also models real life decision more 
accurately. We can now make decisions based on 
information sensitivity in addition to “about what” and 
“to whom”. Also by introducing the PIV into our 
existing RBAC mechanism the system can be setup to 
mimic the behaviour of the previously evaluated CCS 
mechanism or the current RBAC, if desired. 
The added functionality has a performance cost. The 
present mechanism can effectively cache access 
decisions as they need only be evaluated when 
preferences change. By basing access on dynamic 
information, the effectiveness of caching is significantly 
reduced. However, we anticipate that the additional load 
will be well within the increasing computational power 
of personal devices. 
DISCUSSION 
By using levels of invasiveness, rather than simply 
allowing or denying access, many new doors are opened. 
One of the attractive features is that the complexity of 
the mechanism is primarily determined by the 
preferences being described. This ensures that the 
mechanism is sufficiently simple for a novice user, yet 
flexible enough for an expert.  
In our initial evaluation of the approach, PI is treated as 
a single value. We are also considering whether it might 
be beneficial to take a multi-dimensional view of PI. The 
balance between any benefits and increased complexity 
will need to be carefully evaluated.  
The PIV extension may also benefit from explicit role 
activation, though this needs to be evaluated against the 
extra knowledge needed by the context consumers. 
At this stage it is still unclear what the full potential of 
the PIV approach is, but we believe that it is sufficiently 
interesting to be worthy of further investigation. 
RELATED WORK 
Whereas we have extended the protection mechanism by 
increasing the responsibility of the permissions others 
have extended the RBAC model [12, 13] itself. We have 
found, though, that even the simple RBAC in our 
infrastructure is considerable more difficult to setup than 
the CCS previously evaluated. By retaining the simplest 
RBAC model possible and introducing the concept of 
PIV we can address the current limitations without 
further complicating the privacy protection mechanism. 
The added flexibility may even make administration 
easier by reducing the number of roles required. 
CONCLUSION 
We have here presented an extension that has been 
developed to address the limitations of our current 
RBAC-based privacy protection mechanism. We suggest 
that by describing privacy preferences in terms of 
privacy invasiveness, sufficient flexibility is gained to 
alleviate these limitations and to allow further control. 
Since the PIV concept represents our day to day privacy 
decisions more closely than the current RBAC’s 
allow/deny states, the effectiveness of the protection 
mechanism is improved. Its simplicity, and the benefits 
found so far, makes the approach sufficiently interesting 
to warrant further research into its potential. 
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